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SUSPECT ASSERTIONS OF COPYRIGHT 
EDWARD LEE* 
My job is essentially that of an entertainer, no different to that of a 
musician, no different to that of an actor. I just happen to be an author. 
  —Bryce Courtenay1 
INTRODUCTION 
Judge M. Margaret McKeown provides an enlightening—and 
thoroughly entertaining—discussion in her Keynote Address, “Censorship 
in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright and the First 
Amendment.”2  The essay is an important work that legal scholars are likely 
to draw from and discuss for years to come.  Rightfully so.  Judge 
McKeown’s Keynote is at once an exegesis of the longstanding tension 
between copyright law and the First Amendment, and a challenge for us, in 
the Internet age, to recognize: “Censorship in the guise of authorship and 
copyright is a trend that calls on us to stand up and take notice.”3 
In this reply, I ask: What next?  If we take Judge McKeown’s challenge 
seriously—and I believe we should—how and when should courts police for 
copyright claims that might censor or restrict free expression?  I will break 
down this issue into two: (a) which assertions of copyright are impermissible 
or suspect from a First Amendment view, and, relatedly, (b) which doctrines 
are best suited to addressing these suspect assertions of copyright?  In this 
reply, I sketch out a few thoughts on how courts might answer these 
questions. 
 
 *  Professor of Law.  Founder, The Free Internet Project.  Many thanks to Patrick Goold, Laura 
Heymann, and Christina Mulligan for their comments on an earlier draft, and to Steve Heyman and Justin 
Hughes for discussions about the First Amendment and authorship, respectively.  I also benefited greatly 
from the vigorous debate about Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) on the 
CyberProf listserv.  And, of course, thanks to Judge McKeown for her illuminating Keynote Address.  
Ryan Backman provided excellent research assistance. 
 1.  Bryce Courtenay Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/brycecourt527338.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 2.  Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright 
and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2016). 
 3.  Id. at 16. 
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I.  IDENTIFYING SUSPECT ASSERTIONS OF COPYRIGHT 
One challenge for courts is figuring out which assertions of copyright 
are suspect from a First Amendment viewpoint.  The Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Eldred and Golan may have left a false sense of security that 
fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy will generally keep copyright law 
from First Amendment conflicts.4  “[W]hen . . . Congress has not altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection [such as fair use and the idea-
expression dichotomy], further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary,” 
the Court proclaimed.5  Judge McKeown rightfully questions whether fair 
use can adequately do this job of providing a free speech safety valve, given 
the doctrine’s “imprecise nature and application.”6  Moreover, in Eldred and 
Golan, the Court decided facial constitutional challenges to copyright 
provisions.7  But, as Judge McKeown’s Keynote shows, there may be cases 
involving aggressive or dubious copyright claims, which, as applied, raise 
First Amendment concerns.8  In this section, I explore how courts might 
identify constitutionally suspect assertions of copyright—what Judge 
McKeown calls “copyright as censorship,”9 while in the next section, I 
examine other copyright doctrines that may provide additional First 
Amendment safeguards to deal with these suspect assertions of copyright. 
A.  Fair?: Protecting Privacy and Reputation of Authors Under the Right of 
First Publication and Other Copyright Doctrines 
Reviewing a series of cases in which copyright owners seemed more 
concerned about protecting their reputation or privacy, Judge McKeown 
suggests one potential suspect category: copyright assertions “to protect 
privacy interests” or “to prevent the spread of damaging or offensive 
information on the Internet.”10  Judge McKeown attributes the increasing 
popularity to invoke copyright as a privacy or reputational protection to the 
 
 4.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“To the extent such assertions raise First 
Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address 
them.”); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891 (2012) (“Given the ‘speech-protective purposes and 
safeguards’ embraced by copyright law, we concluded in Eldred that there was no call for the heightened 
review petitioners sought in that case. We reach the same conclusion here.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 5.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 6.  McKeown, supra note 2, at 16. 
 7.  See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–21 (characterizing petitioners’ challenge as one to the 
constitutionality of entire term extension); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–93 (characterizing petitioners’ 
challenge as one to the constitutionality of entire copyright restoration provision). 
 8.  See McKeown, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
 9.  Id. at 16. 
 10.  Id. at 11-12. 
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growth of the Internet—where damage to reputation can be immense—and 
a combination of other factors that make copyright a more attractive option 
to seek suppression of online content than the weak privacy protections in 
U.S. law.11  Most of the cases Judge McKeown uses as examples involved 
allegedly infringing content (usually in the form of a video or photograph) 
that was posted online.12 
Judge McKeown’s insight about the Internet and copyright’s 
attractiveness for seeking the suppression of content provides reason alone 
to pay heed to her essay.13  The Internet is driving this trend to use copyright 
in what amounts to a “privacy copyright.”  The Internet enables billions of 
people to publish content (everyone is a publisher) to potentially a worldwide 
audience.14  Posting embarrassing videos or photographs of someone online 
can be ruinous to a person’s career and reputation, if not life.15  But legal 
protections for privacy are relatively weak in the United States, as Judge 
McKeown points out.16  So, copyright law—with its arsenal of DMCA 
notice-and-takedown, statutory damages, and injunctive relief—has 
effectively become a surrogate for privacy law. 
The difficult question is whether a copyright owner’s desire to protect 
privacy or reputational interests through an assertion of copyright is, in itself, 
suspect or deserving of greater scrutiny.  Some commentators and jurists 
would say yes.  In his seminal article on fair use, Judge Pierre Leval comes 
out unequivocally against using copyright to achieve privacy goals.17  As I 
read Judge McKeown’s Keynote, I think she sides with Judge Leval’s view.  
Describing the controversy in Garcia v. Google, Judge McKeown explained: 
“Indeed, there was a fundamental mismatch between Garcia’s claimed harm 
(death threats and reputational harm) and the purpose of the copyright laws 
(to stimulate creative expression, not to protect secrecy).”18 
In my view, though, copyright law legitimately protects an author’s 
reputation or privacy interests in some cases.  The answer depends in part on 
 
 11.  Id. at 11-16. 
 12.  Two cases involved paper magazines.  See Monge v. Maya Magazines, 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 
2012); Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2012).  The rest involved web publications.  See Garcia 
v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 
1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012); Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (D. Fla. 2012); Caner v. Autry, 16 F. 
Supp. 3d 689 (W.D. Va. 2014). 
 13.  See McKeown, supra note 2, at 11–16. 
 14.  Id. at 11–12. 
 15.  Id. at 12. 
 16.  Id. at 14–15. 
 17.  Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1130 (1990) (“Privacy 
and concealment are antithetical to the utilitarian goals of copyright.”). 
 18.  See McKeown, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis added). 
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whether the author of the work is asserting the copyright.  If the author is, 
she may have a legitimate interest in protecting her reputation as an author 
or privacy over her unpublished work through some copyright doctrines, 
such as the right of first publication or the right to make a derivative work.  
However, if a mere transferee who obtained the copyright is asserting the 
claim, then the copyright holder lacks the same authorial basis to warrant 
concern for the author’s reputation or privacy.  Because privacy and 
reputation are personal interests, it is reasonable to limit copyright’s 
vindication of those interests to cases brought by the person whose privacy 
or reputation as an author is at stake.19  A similar approach applies to 
constitutional rights, which typically require the individual whose rights 
have been violated to assert the claim (except in the limited cases involving 
third-party standing or the overbreadth doctrine).20  The Copyright Clause 
focuses on protecting rights of “authors” in their “writings” for a limited 
time, all to promote “progress.”21  The Copyright Act itself sometimes limits 
certain rights to authors: for example, the inalienable rights of attribution and 
integrity for works of visual art apply only to authors during their lifetimes, 
and the inalienable termination right applies only to authors and their heirs 
for a limited time.22  These rights are more personal and are designed to 
protect the interests of authors, not the general class of copyright owners.  
The privacy and reputational interests of authors are cut from the same cloth.  
If copyright law is to be used at all to protect such personal interests, only 
authors should be permitted to have standing to assert their rights.  Below I 
outline several rights under copyright law that may be used to vindicate 
authors’ privacy or reputational interests in appropriate cases. 
 
 19.  Cf. Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding Article III 
standing where plaintiffs alleged concrete injury and particularized grievance they suffered from statutory 
privacy violation); In re Perry, 423 B.R. 215, 266 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (finding standing for defamation claim 
under Texas law where plaintiffs alleged they “were personally aggrieved and had their reputations 
harmed by the accusations of Perry”).  This is not to say that copyright owners who obtain a copyright by 
transfer from an author cannot invoke the right of first publication (or other exclusive rights).  Of course, 
copyright owners can do so.  But their vindication of copyrights would emanate from their economic 
interests as copyright owners and not the personal interests of authors.  For example, an author who 
assigned the right of first publication to a publisher would be responsible for ensuring that she is satisfied 
with the final draft she submits to the publisher.  If a third party published a stolen copy of the final 
manuscript, the publisher could sue the third party for copyright infringement to protect its economic 
interest in publishing the work first. 
 20.  See Matthew Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A 
Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1391–92 (2000). 
 21.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 22.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A, 203, 301(c)–(d) (2015). 
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An author’s right of first publication—which is codified in Section 
106(3) of the Copyright Act23—has been viewed as a right that is designed 
to protect an author’s reputation and privacy interests, giving the author the 
ultimate control of when her work is first distributed to the public.24  In the 
1976 Act, federal copyright largely replaced the common law copyright, 
which had been traditionally viewed as protecting privacy interests in 
unpublished expression.25 
As Professor Jake Linford explains, the right to first publication has 
both privacy and economic underpinnings.26  In Harper & Row, the Supreme 
Court likened the “common-law copyright . . . often enlisted in the service 
of personal privacy” to “an author’s right to choose when he will publish” a 
work under a federal copyright—the latter right being “no less deserving of 
protection” than the former in the Court’s view.27  The Court recognized that 
the right of first publication protected both personal and economic interests 
of the author: “The author’s control of first public distribution implicates not 
only his personal interest in creative control but his property interest in 
exploitation of prepublication rights.”28  Writing for the majority of the Ninth 
Circuit panel in Monge v. Maya Magazine, Judge McKeown favorably cited 
Harper & Row for the proposition that “[a] use that so clearly infringes the 
copyright holder’s interests in confidentiality and creative control is difficult 
to characterize as fair.”29  Similarly, the Second Circuit’s rejection of a fair 
use defense in a biographer’s copying of portions of J.D. Salinger’s 
 
 23.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (“Under this provision the copyright owner would 
have the right to control the first public distribution of an authorized copy or phonorecord of his work, 
whether by sale, gift, loan, or some rental or lease arrangement.”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (The 1976 Copyright Act “recognized for the first time a distinct 
statutory right of first publication, which had previously been an element of the common-law protections 
afforded unpublished works.”); see also Ned Snow, A Copyright Conundrum: Protecting Email Privacy, 
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 501, 539–40 (2007). 
 24.  See Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF 
U.S.A., 585, 602 (2011) (“Lord Mansfield also associated this right of first publication with a right of the 
author to profit from his reputation and to be protected from the attempts of others to free-ride on that 
reputation.”); id. at 594 (“While many courts have treated the right of first publication as analogous to 
chattel property rights in unpublished manuscripts or privacy interests of particular authors attempting 
to exercise the right of first publication, the right is best understood to protect the market-entry concerns 
of the owners—the ability to decide with whom, and how, to disseminate a work for public 
consumption.”) (emphasis added). 
 25.  See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555 (“It is true that common-law copyright was often enlisted 
in the service of personal privacy.”) (citing Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 198–99 (1890)). 
 26.  Linford, supra note 24, at 620 (“The privacy rationale for the right of first publication overlaps 
with economic rationales in several ways.”). 
 27.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554. 
 28.  Id. at 555. 
 29.  Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harper & Row, 
471 U.S. at 564) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
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unpublished letters can also be viewed as protecting the privacy in the 
expression contained in the letters.30  The right of first publication may also 
protect an author’s reputation by enabling authors to avoid inferior or 
unfinished versions of their work from being published without their 
consent.  The basic policy makes intuitive sense: just imagine the public 
could read an unpublished rough draft of your writing and the harm to your 
reputation that may ensue. 
Moreover, the First Amendment right of individuals not to speak aligns 
with an author’s right not to publish her work until ready or at all.  The 
Supreme Court recognized this symmetry in Harper & Row: “copyright, and 
the right of first publication in particular, serve this countervailing First 
Amendment value [in the right not to speak].”31  The right not to speak can 
be viewed as a form of First Amendment privacy.32  For copyright law to 
vindicate that privacy right through the enforcement of an author’s right of 
first publication is entirely consistent with the First Amendment.33 
Copyright law protects an author’s reputation through doctrines beyond 
the right of first publication. For example, the right to make derivative works 
can be viewed as protecting an author’s economic and reputational 
interests.34  As Professor Laura Heymann explained: 
Indeed, one might consider the fact that U.S. copyright law grants the 
author control over derivative works to be a powerful tool in this regard, 
in that an author can prohibit the creation of derivative works by others 
not only to ensure that he or she has control over the economic benefits 
that come from such works but also to control the reputational interest 
that comes from having a consistent canon.35 
Also, the right of public performance of an author’s work—such as music 
used in political campaigns of Democrats or Republicans—may protect the 
reputation of the author, enabling the author to disassociate herself from a 
political candidate she does not support (or even despises).36  In many of 
 
 30.  Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Salinger has a right to protect 
the expressive content of his unpublished writings for the term of his copyright, and that right prevails 
over a claim of fair use under ‘ordinary circumstances.’”); see also Patrick Goold, Unbundling the “Tort” 
of Copyright Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing Salinger as example of 
copyright protecting “expressive privacy” of author). 
 31.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559. 
 32.  See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 401–02 (2008). 
 33.  See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
1083, 1149–50, 1157 (2010). 
 34.  See Note, An Author’s Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
1490, 1493–96 (1979). 
 35.  Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
1341, 1401–02 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 36.  Id. at 1402-03; see also Scott Timberg, Can R.E.M. Demand Donald Trump “Cease and 
Desist” Playing Their Song?, SALON (Sept. 10, 2015, 1:09 PM CDT) 
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these cases, the author may be seeking to vindicate both economic and 
personal interests.  It would grind copyright law to a halt if courts had to 
determine which motive of the author—economic or personal—was the 
primary reason for bringing the lawsuit.  If the author had mixed motives, 
why should copyright law care? 
I am not suggesting that protecting an author’s privacy or reputation 
through copyright is always legitimate.  Instead, my point is that it may be 
in some cases.  Authors have legitimate privacy interests in their works 
before first publication, which intersects with their right not to speak under 
the First Amendment.  Authors also have valid reputational interests with 
respect to their works that, in some cases, copyright law may appropriately 
protect.  Protecting these personal interests need not conflict with the 
utilitarian goals of copyright law to incentivize authors to create works.  
Indeed, a reasonable regard for such interests in copyright law may help to 
fuel authors to create more works as copyright law empowers them to 
develop their name and reputation as authors, protected from unauthorized 
uses of their works constituting infringement.  If everyone could publish their 
own sequels and movies of Harry Potter without copyright permission, 
would J.K. Rowling have had the desire and creative spark to write and 
publish seven Harry Potter novels of her own?37  In the name of Merlin, I 
dare say not. 
B.  Foul: Protecting Privacy of Authors Outside of Right of First 
Publication 
Other uses of copyright for privacy beyond the right of first publication 
are suspect, however.  Such assertions of copyright raise a potential First 
Amendment problem.  If a work has already been published with the author’s 
authorization, then the author has effectively renounced her First 
Amendment right not to speak and whatever privacy interest in the work 
copyright protects through the right of first publication is lost.  The First 
Amendment cases barring the government from punishing publication of 
truthful information provide some authority for doubting that copyright can 
be asserted by authors to protect the privacy of works they have already 




 37.  Of course, fair use and other copyright exceptions limit the extent to which authors can control 
their works. 
 38.  Cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); 
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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first-sale doctrine, which extinguishes an author’s right to control the 
dissemination of a copy of her work once she has parted ownership of the 
copy.39 
C.  Foul: Protecting Reputation or Privacy of Non-Authors 
Also dubious are copyright assertions by non-authors (such as mere 
copyright transferees) who assert copyrights to protect their own reputation 
or privacy, or even the authors’ reputation or privacy.  In these cases brought 
by non-authors, the claim for protecting the author’s reputation or privacy 
over the work as a part of copyright law is diminished, if not destroyed.  As 
explained above, the author’s privacy and reputation are personal rights; to 
the extent copyright law protects them at all, the standing to assert such 
personal rights should be limited to authors. 
Three of the questionable “privacy copyright” cases Judge McKeown 
identifies fall into this category of non-authors seeking to protect their 
reputations or privacy: Hulk Hogan, TV news reporter Catherine Balsley, 
and Miami businessman Raanan Katz were not authors of the embarrassing 
works (a sex video of Hogan made without his knowledge, a topless photo 
of Balsley, and an unflattering photo of Katz) they respectively sought to 
suppress from public scrutiny.40  Balsley and Katz each later acquired the 
copyright of the photo they sought to be suppressed—which put them in a 
stronger litigation position than Hogan (who lacked a copyright), but the 
ownership of a copyright did not diminish the First Amendment concern that 
would be raised if a court issued an injunction to remove the content in any 
of the copyright cases.41  Another case of this ilk is Howard Hughes’s 
infamous attempt to buy and enforce copyrights in magazine articles about 
him, in order to stop Random House’s use of them in a biography about 
him.42  In each case, it is problematic to use copyright to stop the 
 
 39.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2015); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976). 
 40.  See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328–30 (M.D. Fla. 2012); Balsley 
v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 754 (6th Cir. 2012); Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1315 (D. Fla. 
2012). 
 41.  See Balsley, 691 F.3d at 755; Tim Elfprink, Ranaan Katz, Heat Minority Owner, Loses Tussle 
with Blogger Over Embarrassing Photo, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), 
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/ranaan-katz-heat-minority-owner-loses-tussle-with-blogger-
over-embarrassing-photo-7929046 (“Katz bought the copyright with the express intent to wipe the photo 
off the internet.”).  Hulk Hogan was successful in Florida state court in his invasion of privacy claim 
against website Gawker under state law; a jury awarded a total of $140.1 million dollars in damages to 
Hogan, although the ruling is being appealed.  See Gawker Files Motions Seeking New Trial in Hulk 
Hogan Invasion of Privacy Case, THE GUARDIAN (April 6, 2016, 11:34 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/apr/06/hulk-hogan-gawker-files-motions-seeking-new-trial. 
 42.  Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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dissemination of the works to protect the reputation or privacy of non-
authors.  None of the courts allowed an injunction.  Balsley was the only case 
in which the plaintiff was successful in establishing copyright infringement, 
but the remedy was limited to an award of damages, not an injunction: The 
photograph of her in Hustler magazine was not removed.43 
The amici curiae brief of Internet law professors in Garcia offers other 
examples that also fall into this category of non-authors: (i) individuals 
obtaining prospective copyright assignments of any review of them by their 
clients (in order to stop negative reviews online); and (ii) individuals 
obtaining copyrights (through transfer or even default judgments) to remove 
truthful and at times embarrassing content about them.44  These cases reek of 
the “censorship in the guise of copyright” that Judge McKeown criticizes. 
Cindy Lee Garcia, an actor in the “Innocence of Muslims” video, also 
falls into the category of non-author in the Ninth Circuit’s view.45  The 
Court’s view is certainly reasonable.  If Garcia is just an actor and not an 
author, she has no basis to assert what amounts to a right of first publication.  
Respectfully, though, I think Garcia’s claim of authorship raised a closer 
issue than the Court did.  I do not necessarily think that Garcia should have 
been considered an author, but her position was neither frivolous nor without 
some force. 
Imagine if the late David Bowie let a music label record Bowie’s 
performance of an Annie Lennox song (by license from her), but the label 
later published a sound recording of his performance that left out key parts 
of the recording and dubbed in audio of another singer over Bowie’s voice 
for one line, all without Bowie’s permission.46  The label sold the bastardized 
recording of Bowie in an album in which the label did the same thing to 
twenty other performers as well—dubbing over their voices and turning the 
recordings into bastardized versions without the performers’ knowledge or 
consent.  Assume there was no written contract governing who owned the 
copyrights to the recordings.  In this scenario, Bowie would have a decent 
claim of authorship in the sound recording of his performance.  (The other 
 
 43.  See Balsley, 691 F.3d at 757. 
 44.  Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Professors in Support of Appellees Google, Inc. and 
YouTube, LLC at 9–14, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (No. 12-57302), 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/11/25/1257302%20Amicus%20by%20Internet%20L
aw%20Professors.pdf.  For an excellent summary of copyright cases in which privacy and reputation may 
be one motivation for the lawsuit, see Jeanne Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property 
Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 557–74 (2015). 
 45.  Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737–38. 
 46.  Justin Hughes suggested a similar hypothetical in a discussion with me a year before Bowie’s 
death. 
2 LEE, ED - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/16  3:51 PM 
388 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 15:379 
performers would have the same as to their sound recordings, respectively.)  
Should Bowie be disqualified from copyright just because he seeks to protect 
his reputation by invoking copyright?  Bowie’s reputational interests in 
enforcing his right of first publication to stop the record label’s distribution 
seems just as important as his economic interest in the right.  Indeed, the 
reputational harm to Bowie as an artist may be far greater than the economic 
harm from the record label’s unauthorized release of the bastardized 
recording of Bowie’s performance. 
If the right of first publication protects Bowie’s reputational and 
economic interests in this scenario, then why not protect Garcia’s interests?  
Surely her reputation as an actor affects her economic interests in 
performing.  It may well be that she should not be considered an author of 
her recorded performance, as the Ninth Circuit concluded, but it is not clear 
to me that the reasons for rejecting her claim of authorship derive from a 
“mismatch” between her reputational interests and the purposes of copyright 
law.  Those interests and purposes may well be aligned here.  Put another 
way, if Garcia were Bowie performing and the performance involved singing 
not acting, would any court have any trouble treating Bowie as an author of 
the part of the sound recording that included him? 
The big difference appears to be that Garcia’s involves an acting 
performance fixed in a short video (shot by a director for a movie that 
apparently was never made), while Bowie’s involves a singing performance 
fixed by a producer in a sound recording.  Perhaps that makes a world of 
difference, even though both artists seek to protect their reputations from 
unauthorized, bastardized versions of their recorded performances.  Of 
course, this is not to suggest that Garcia should be mentioned in the same 
breath as Bowie in terms of artistic abilities.  But, following Justice Holmes’s 
famous admonition, copyright law should refrain from evaluating the artistic 
merit of copyrighted works.47 
Tweak the hypothetical once more and the distinction collapses: Instead 
of a sound recording, imagine that, with Bowie’s permission, a producer 
recorded, on video, Bowie’s performance of the Annie Lennox song.  It’s the 
exact same performance by Bowie, but one was recorded as a sound 
recording and the other as an audiovisual work.  Does Bowie’s claim of 
authorship to his recorded performance on video disappear simply because 
of the slight change in recording? 
 
 47.  See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, 
some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation.”). 
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What may be really driving the distinction is an unstated background 
norm of who constitutes an author in the respective artistic endeavors of 
acting versus singing.  To borrow Judge Posner’s discussion of why editors 
and research assistants are not joint authors, “copyright would explode” if 
every actor is an author of her performance in every movie she acted in.48  
Or, as Judge McKeown put it, “Garcia’s theory would make ‘swiss cheese’ 
of copyright law—the practical result would be fragmenting a movie into 
thousands of copyrights.”49 
But would it?  The work-made-for-hire provision enables movie studios 
and producers to avoid precisely this problem.50  The provision becomes a 
nullity if courts enable producers to avoid the requirements of the provision, 
either employment status or, for specially commissioned works, (including 
“a motion picture or other audiovisual work”) the writing requirement.51  
There can be no threat of holdup by any actor if producers simply follow the 
clear rules of the work-made-for-hire provision.  In Garcia, the work-made-
for-hire issue was never resolved.52 
The text of the Copyright Act does not say who among performers and 
sound or film producers should be treated as authors.  But the Act expressly 
recognizes that a work may be created and fixed over time or in several 
different versions and that each version constitutes “a separate work.”53  In 
other words, maybe the Copyright Act doesn’t contemplate making a work 
into “swiss cheese,” but it does contemplate making each version its own 
slice of cheese. 
Thus, as each scene of “Innocence of Muslims” was shot over several 
days, an audiovisual work was created for each part that was recorded, 
 
 48.  Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658 (2004). 
 49.  McKeown, supra note 2, at 7.  For an excellent essay criticizing copyright law’s (mis)treatment 
of performances as not constituting creative expression, see Mathilde Pavis, Is There Any-Body on Stage? 
A Legal (Mis)understanding of Performances, 19 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 1–5 (2016). 
 50.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2015) (works made for hire provision and definition); Guy A. 
Rub, Stronger Than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH 49, 120 (2013) (“The related work-made-for-hire doctrine . . . is crucial in limiting the number of 
authors in some cases, particularly in the movie and software industries.”). 
 51.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (definition of “work made for hire”: (1) “a work prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment”; or “a work specially ordered or commissioned for 
use . . . as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, . . . if the parties expressly agree in a 
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”); F. Jay 
Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright 
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 317-25 (2001) (discussing work made for hire in movie industry). 
 52.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 741 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 53.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (“A work is ‘created’ when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the 
first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any 
particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different 
versions, each version constitutes a separate work.”). 
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including the unedited versions.  The final, edited version of “Innocence of 
Muslims” constituted a separate work.  But it did not extinguish the 
copyrights for the unedited versions, much of which probably did not make 
the final cut.54  A third party could not steal and publish the unedited versions 
without violating the copyrights.  Moreover, if the scenes involving Garcia 
were fixed separately “under her authority” (presumably she authorized the 
unedited footage of her to be recorded), they would arguably constitute a 
separate work under the Copyright Act.55  According to her Complaint, the 
unedited version of her performance lasted longer than five seconds and 
consisted of five and a half pages of script pages, shot over three and half 
days.56  There were no factual findings indicating whether Garcia received 
any specific direction from the video’s producer or director, other than what 
was contained in the script.  It is possible that, other than the lines she spoke 
from a script, Garcia maintained all creative control over her performance, 
including all the nonverbal expression, such as facial expression and body 
language. Given the apparent low budget nature of the video’s production, 
that probably is a fair assumption.  Also, it is notable that her scene did not 
involve a parade of other actors; the only footage involving Garcia that was 
incorporated into the edited video involved, at most, only one other actor.57 
The text of the Copyright Act is silent on who should be considered the 
author of the work—the performer, the video’s producer, or both.  The same 
can be said of the hypothetical involving David Bowie and the record 
studio—although legislative history of the Sound Recordings Act of 1971 
and the Copyright Office’s position support treating both performer and 
producer as joint authors.58  At the very least, the text of the Copyright Act 
 
 54.  See Bull Publishing Co. v. Sandoz Nutrition Corp., 1989 WL 201080, No. C87-4723-DLJ, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal, July 7, 1989) (each version of manual was a separate work); cf. Walt Disney Productions 
v. Filmation Associates, 628 F. Supp. 871, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (discussing infringing copies that are 
created before defendant’s final film was produced). 
 55.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (definition of “fixed”: “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of 
expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for 
a period of more than transitory duration.”); see Leto v. RCA Corp., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1006 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (interpreting “under the authority of the author” to mean with the author’s consent). 
 56.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio 
Artists et al. at 21, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/12/09/12-57302%20Amicus%20by%20SAG.pdf. 
 57.  Sam Bacile – The Innocence of Muslims Trailer, YOUTUBE (May 19, 2015), 
https://youtu.be/YJBWCLeOEaM?t=9m4s. 
 58.  See Mark H. Jaffe, Defusing the Time Bomb Once Again—Determining Authorship in Sound 
Recording, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 144–46 (Fall 2005–Winter 2006); U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, CIRCULAR 56A: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND 
RECORDINGS 1, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56a.pdf (2012) (“The author of a sound recording is 
the performer(s) whose performance is fixed, or the record producer who processes the sounds and fixes 
them in the final recording, or both.”); Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, Before the 
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does not foreclose Garcia’s claim of authorship.  Instead, we have to rely on 
background norms on who qualifies as an author, such as the Copyright 
Office’s “longstanding practices [that] do not allow a copyright claim by an 
individual actor or actress in his or her performance contained within a 
motion picture.”59  Perhaps that makes pragmatic sense for feature-length 
movies, which can involve numerous actors.  But, in this case, apparently no 
feature-length movie has ever surfaced, assuming one was even made.60  The 
only thing we have is a short YouTube video.  That’s it.  At least from the 
standpoint of creative expression, there does not appear to be a material 
difference between acting and singing that would automatically disqualify 
one activity from constituting authorship when recorded, but not the other.  
As Bowie himself described, “I really do just write and record what interests 
me and I do approach the stage shows in much the same way.”61 
In any event, regardless of the outcome in Garcia, non-authors who 
seek to use copyrights to protect their own privacy and reputation by 
suppressing unflattering or unfavorable content may raise a conflict with the 
First Amendment. 
D.  Foul: Removing a Work When the Work Itself Is the Subject of Political 
Controversy 
Another First Amendment red flag arises when the work itself is the 
subject of a political controversy.  In such cases, a copyright assertion that 
seeks to remove the work from public scrutiny might raise a First 
Amendment conflict.  To me, this concern best explains why the Ninth 
Circuit panel’s grant of an injunction in Garcia was improper. 
This approach is suggested in Judge McKeown’s decision in Monge v. 
Maya Magazines.62  The Court rejected the defendant’s fair use defense in 
publishing the photos from the plaintiffs’ secret wedding.  Even though the 
plaintiffs were using copyright to serve their privacy interest in keeping their 
 
House Subcommittee on Courts on Intellectual Property on the Issue of Sound Recordings as Works 
Made for Hire, 106th Congress, May 25, 2000, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat52500.html (“The 
copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not always, involve 'authorship' both on 
the part of the performers whose performance is captured and on the part of the record producer 
responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and electronically processing the sounds, and 
compiling and editing them to make the final sound recording.”). 
 59.  Garcia, 786 F.3d at 741. 
 60.  Paul Bond, Does ‘Innocence of Muslims’ Actually Exist?, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 19, 
2012) http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/innocence-of-muslims-movie-youtube-trailer-371465. 
 61.  David Bowie Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/d/davidbowie309818.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 62.  688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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wedding photographs from public consumption, the privacy interest did not 
disqualify the plaintiffs’ copyright assertion.  Instead, the Court noted that 
“the controversy has little to do with the photos” themselves, because the 
fact of a secret wedding was the story, which could be discussed without 
publishing the photographs.63  As Judge McKeown admits in her Keynote, 
Monge was a difficult case, and one might question (as the dissenting judge 
did) whether fair use provided an adequate safeguard for free speech.64  
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the decision in Nunez, in which 
the First Circuit held that a newspaper’s publication of risqué photographs 
of Miss Universe Puerto Rico was a fair use.  The First Circuit characterized 
Nunez as a case where “the pictures were the story,” which weighed in favor 
of fair use in their publication.65  The photographs themselves were the 
putative reason to disqualify the winner of Miss Universe Puerto Rico from 
serving in that role. 
Garcia v. Google strikes me as an even stronger case than Nunez of an 
instance in which the work itself was the subject of a political controversy.  
In my view, the First Amendment problem in Garcia rests not on the 
plaintiff’s assertion of copyright to protect her reputation or the flimsiness of 
her claim of authorship, but instead on the remedy sought by the plaintiff to 
remove from public scrutiny a work that was the subject of a great political 
controversy.  Arguably, the First Amendment problem would have existed 
even if the rightful copyright owner of the edited video (presumably the 
video’s producer and creator, Mark Basseley Youssef) had sought the 
removal of infringing copies of the video from YouTube, while removing 
the only copy he uploaded.  The video had sparked protests in the Middle 
East and was a key point of inquiry during Congress’s investigation of the 
Benghazi attack; the White House’s reference to the video in its explanation 
of the attack became a major area of dispute between President Obama and 
Republican nominee Mitt Romney during the 2012 presidential debates.66  
The video itself was the political controversy—of both national and 
international magnitude. 
 
 63.  Id. at 1175. 
 64.  See McKeown, supra note 2, at 10. 
 65.  Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 66.  See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 737–38 (9th Cir. 2015); Flashback: What Susan Rice 
Said About Benghazi, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2012),  (“But putting together the best information that we 
have available to us today our current assessment is that what happened in Benghazi was in fact initially 
a spontaneous reaction to what had just transpired hours before in Cairo, almost a copycat of– of the 
demonstrations against our facility in Cairo, which were prompted, of course, by the [‘Innocence of 
Muslims’] video.”) (quoting UN Ambassador Susan Rice); Michael McGough, Opinion, Did the 
Benghazi Committee Avenge Mitt Romney? Not Quite, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015) 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-hillaryclinton-benghazi-romney-20151023-story.html. 
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Thus, for a court to order the removal of “Innocence of Muslims” from 
YouTube, even at the behest of the rightful copyright owner, would likely 
violate the First Amendment.  To borrow the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in 
Garcia on different facts than my hypothetical: “The mandatory injunction 
censored and suppressed a politically significant film . . . . In so doing, the 
panel deprived the public of the ability to view firsthand, and judge for 
themselves, a film at the center of an international uproar.”67  In my view, 
this First Amendment problem would arise from a court order requiring the 
video’s removal from YouTube regardless of who the plaintiff was, either 
the author or Garcia. 
My approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
“Pentagon Papers” case, which held that an injunction to stop a newspaper’s 
publication of a secret Department of Defense study about U.S. military 
involvement in Vietnam was an unlawful prior restraint.68  Like the video in 
Garcia, the Pentagon Papers became a source of immense political 
controversy.  It cast doubt on statements about Vietnam made by President 
Lyndon Johnson during the 1964 presidential election.69  It is hard to imagine 
that the outcome would have been any different if the Pentagon Papers were 
copyrighted.  A claim of copyright over the Pentagon Papers (assuming for 
the sake of argument that government works were copyrightable in the 
United States as they are in some countries) would not have avoided the First 
Amendment violation resulting from the injunction. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row is not to the contrary.  
There, the Court rejected a magazine’s First Amendment argument to justify 
“scooping” the publication of former President Ford’s autobiography (after 
he left office) by copying and publishing quotes (consisting of 400 words) 
from the book before it was published.70  In Harper & Row, the copied 
quotations from former President Ford were not themselves the reason for or 
the subject of a political controversy.  While the quotes related to Ford’s 
reasons for pardoning President Nixon, that controversial decision existed 
before Ford wrote his book.71  In other words, the quotes in Ford’s 
unpublished book did not spark or create the political controversy. 
 
 67.  Garcia, 786 F.3d at 747. 
 68.  See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam). 
 69.  See The Pentagon Papers, UPI (1971), http://www.upi.com/Archives/Audio/Events-of-
1971/The-Pentagon-Papers. 
 70.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). 
 71.  Id. at 555. 
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By contrast, the video in Garcia did.  The YouTube video was the 
raison d’être for the political protests and controversy.  Without the video, 
there would have been no protests or controversy.72 
In sum, I have suggested that copyright assertions may be suspect from 
a First Amendment view in the following circumstances: (1) copyright 
assertions by authors who are primarily seeking to protect their own privacy 
by the removal of copies of a work from public scrutiny outside of the right 
of first publication; (2) copyright assertions by non-authors who are 
primarily seeking to protect their reputation or privacy by the removal of 
copies of a work from public scrutiny; and (3) copyright assertions by any 
plaintiff (authors and non-authors) who attempt to remove from public 
scrutiny a work that is itself the subject of a political controversy. There may 
be other factors or scenarios in copyright cases that raise First Amendment 
red flags, but I leave such inquiry to future discussion. 
II.  DOCTRINES TO PROTECT AGAINST SUSPECT ASSERTIONS OF 
COPYRIGHT 
If we agree with Judge McKeown about the need for concern about 
expansive assertions of copyright, then it’s important to ask what courts can 
do about such assertions.  This section sketches out potential ways in which 
courts can deal with assertions of copyright that may conflict with the First 
Amendment. 
A.  Authorship 
I agree wholeheartedly with Judge McKeown’s suggestion that 
authorship may be a fertile ground for courts to examine and guard against 
suspect assertions of copyright.  I have outlined above a framework for 
distinguishing suspect copyright assertions by authors versus non-authors in 
asserting claims that may seek to protect their privacy or reputation.  Cases 
in which the copyright owner was not even the author of the work may raise 
a red flag, especially where suppression of the work is sought for what 
amounts to the plaintiff’s privacy or personal reputation.  However, even 
 
 72.  The YouTube video involving Ergun Caner, then dean of Liberty University is similar, but 
slightly more attenuated. See Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689, 693 (W.D. Va. 2014).  The video 
purportedly caught Caner in a lie that undermined his fitness as university president and administrator. 
Although the controversy existed before the defendant’s posting of the video, the video was definitive 
evidence of what Caner had stated.  A Liberty employee posted the video to show that Caner had lied 
during a presentation to the U.S. Marines in which he “proclaimed his Muslim upbringing in Turkey and 
expounded on how Muslims in the Middle East would view the U.S. Marines and approach them from 
the perspective of jihad.”  Id. at 693. 
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where non-authorship raises a red flag, the lawful acquisition of the 
copyrights by the plaintiffs in some controversies (such as by Balsley, Katz, 
and Hughes) may diminish the effectiveness of using the concept of 
authorship as a way to guard against censorship.  Only two of the cases 
(Hogan and Garcia) discussed by Judge McKeown turned on authorship.73  
Instead of authorship, courts may have to resort to equitable doctrines, such 
as fair use, copyright misuse, and the standard for injunctions. 
B.  Defenses: Fair Use and Copyright Misuse 
As Judge McKeown’s Keynote convincingly describes, fair use has 
served as a safety valve by which courts have sometimes considered First 
Amendment interests.  I share her concern that the “imprecise nature and 
application” of the fair use doctrine may undermine its effectiveness 
somewhat.  Nonetheless, courts can incorporate First Amendment 
considerations when evaluating the first factor of fair use, the purpose of the 
defendant’s use of the copyrighted work.  A number of the cases already 
have, tacitly or expressly.74 
Another defense that may help courts police suspect assertions of 
copyright is copyright misuse.  Scholars have already suggested using 
copyright misuse to protect free speech.75  In my view, copyright misuse may 
be well-suited to stopping suspect assertions of copyright.  The equitable 
doctrine enables courts to “appropriately withhold their aid where the 
plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to public interest.”76  The 
copyright cannot be enforced during the period of misuse.77  Indeed, 
copyright misuse might offer courts a cleaner, simpler inquiry than the 
 
 73.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 
913 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012). 
 74.  See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2014) (finding legitimate fair use 
purpose in “the creation of a full-text searchable database”); Monge v. Maya Magazines, 688 F.3d 1164, 
1173 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Although news reporting is an example of fair use, it is not sufficient itself to 
sustain a per se finding of fair use.”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(finding legitimate fair use purpose in “improving access to information on the internet”); Nunez v. 
Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000) (“This informative function is confirmed by 
the newspaper’s presentation of various news articles and interviews in conjunction with the 
reproduction.”). 
 75.  JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse to Protect Digital Free Speech, 
13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 113–15 (2004); see also Fromer, supra note 44, at 586 (proposing use of 
patent and copyright misuse as ways for courts to address patent and copyright cases brought by parties 
whose motivations are “ill-fitting” to the purposes of the law). 
 76.  Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); Lasercomb America, Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing copyright misuse and applying Morton 
Salt). 
 77.  Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005); Practice Management 
Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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balance of factors in fair use: Is this assertion of copyright “contrary to public 
policy” of copyright?78  No need for a court to balance any factors.  Just 
consider if the assertion of copyright is suspect from a First Amendment 
standpoint.  As discussed above, I have identified three such “misuse” 
scenarios: (1) authors’ assertions of copyright to protect their own privacy 
by the removal of copies of their works from public scrutiny after the authors 
have already first published their works; (2) non-authors’ assertions of 
copyrights to protect their reputation or privacy by the removal of copies of 
a work from public scrutiny; and (3) any plaintiffs’ (authors and non-authors 
alike) attempts to remove from public scrutiny a work that is itself the subject 
of a political controversy. 
C.  Remedies: Injunctions v. Damages 
The court’s consideration of what remedies to award in a copyright 
infringement case offers another opportunity for a court to consider First 
Amendment safeguards.  Professors Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh 
focused on the grant of preliminary injunctions in intellectual property 
(including copyright) cases.79  Applying prior restraint doctrine, they suggest 
that a court should refrain from granting a preliminary injunction for alleged 
infringement unless the case for infringement was pretty strong, such as 
when “the defendant has made identical or nearly identical copies of the 
plaintiff’s works, and there is no claim of fair use but only some other 
copyright defense.”80  Lemley and Volokh do not believe a First Amendment 
issue would be raised at the permanent injunction stage if infringement was 
shown.81 
I disagree.  Other areas of law, such as defamation and libel, avoid 
granting permanent injunctions against speech even where liability is 
established.  A basic feature of defamation and libel law is that only 
damages—and not injunctive relief—are available for successful claims of 
defamation or libel.82  The no-injunction rule derives from First Amendment 
concerns: “Indeed, in the vast majority of cases in which courts have 
considered granting an injunction directed at defamatory speech, they refuse 
 
 78.  Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979. 
 79.  See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 210–15 (1998). 
 80.  Id. at 211. 
 81.  Id. (“[W]e don’t believe that prior restraint doctrine prohibits (or should prohibit) permanent 
injunctions of unprotected speech, entered after a full consideration of the merits, whether at trial or on 
summary judgment.”). 
 82.  See David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1, 18 (2013). 
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to do so on the basis that the injunction would be an unconstitutional prior 
restraint.”83 
Although copyright law has routinely allowed injunctions, I suggest 
that, in some cases of infringement, a copyright injunction might violate the 
First Amendment.  In the context of unsuccessful claims of fair use, the Court 
has cautioned courts from automatically enjoining the infringing use: 
“[C]ourts may also wish to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law, 
‘to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,’ are not always 
best served by automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are 
found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.”84  Although the Court did 
not explicitly refer to free speech concerns, they seem evident in its analysis.  
At the very least, the Court recognized that injunctions should not always be 
granted, even where copyright infringement is found. 
Under my theory, even if Garcia was deemed to be an author in Garcia 
v. Google and her claim of infringement was meritorious, or if the rightful 
copyright owner was trying to remove all copies of the video from YouTube, 
an injunction ordering YouTube to remove the video would likely have 
violated the First Amendment.  As discussed above, the video itself was the 
source of national and international political controversy—to remove it from 
public scrutiny would have deprived the public, Congress, and voters in the 
presidential election from the ability to evaluate the controversial content in 
the video.  Judge McKeown says that “a weak copyright claim cannot trump 
the First Amendment.”85  I say that a strong copyright claim cannot, either, 
in some cases.86 
For this reason, I agree with Judge McKeown’s characterization of 
Garcia as raising a concern about “the use of copyright injunctions to impose 
what amounts to prior restraints on offensive, unpopular or sensitive 
speech”: “These kinds of cases look, feel and smell like real First 
Amendment cases.”87  In the end, I think the First Amendment concern in 
 
 83.  Id. at 31. 
 84.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994). 
 85.  McKeown, supra note 2, at 6. 
 86.  I think this principle would apply to the video of the Reginald Denny beating after the Rodney 
King verdict.  A court ordered Reuters and another news organization to pay $60,000 in statutory damages 
for their unauthorized use of video of the beating of Reginald Denny following the Rodney King verdict. 
Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1998).  But if the 
court had issued an injunction against the news organizations barring them showing the video, the 
injunction would likely have violated the First Amendment as a prior restraint. 
 87.  McKeown, supra note 2, at 5; cf. Suntrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co, 252 F3d 1165, 1166 
(11th Cir 2001) (holding that grant of preliminary injunction barring dissemination of allegedly infringing 
derivative work “amounts to an unlawful prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment”). 
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Garcia goes more to the remedy sought than to the issue of authorship.  It 
was censorship in the guise of an injunction. 
 
